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Abstract
A nonlinear dynamic model for the quotes issued by Nasdaq dealers is considered,
focussing on the top two Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), Island and
Instinet, and the three most active market makers for a sample of twenty stocks.
The model extends the standard linear vector error correction model for price dis-
covery in three different ways. First, quote adjustments are set relative to the inside
quote, i.e. the best bid and ask in the market. Second, dealers react to the inside
spread. Third, adjustments differ according to which dealer is currently at the inside.
Adjustments are different if an ECN is currently at the inside compared to an in-
dividual dealer. This difference is attributed to the asymmetric information among
dealers. Price discovery dynamics are studied using generalized impulse response
functions.
Key words: High Frequency data, Dealer markets, Error Correction Models,
Nonlinear Impulse-Response Functions.
1 Introduction
Price discovery is an important aspect of the functioning of financial markets.
It measures which participants contribute most effectively to incorporating
fundamental news about the value of a security. Measures of price discovery
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are typically derived from a dynamic model of prices (or quotes) of the same
asset at different markets or by different participants on a market.
The best known price discovery measure has been developed by Hasbrouck
(1995). It is based on a reduced form vector error correction model of prices.
The only drivers of the price dynamics in this model are past prices. Contri-
butions to price discovery are derived from the long-run impulse responses of
shocks from different market participants. Next to the original application to
equity prices at different regional exchanges, the Hasbrouck (1995) methodol-
ogy has been applied in various other settings. A few examples are Eun and
Sabherwal (2003) who study internationally cross-listed firms, Peiers (1997)
who looks at banks dealing in the foreign exchange market, and Huang (2002)
who investigates the role of Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) on
the Nasdaq.
Apart from past prices, there are various other factors that influence price dy-
namics. Examples are traded volume, trade direction and stock price volatil-
ity. For stock markets these external factors have been investigated by Has-
brouck (1991, 1999), Harris et al. (1995) and Engle and Patton (2004) among
others.
This paper emphasizes the role of an additional variable in the dynamics. Like
Huang (2002), we consider the relation between ECNs and individual deal-
ers on Nasdaq, but we add more detail to the dynamic model. An important
piece of information to dealers are the inside quotes, i.e. the best bid and of-
fer quotes. We include dummy variables that indicate who is at the inside at
any given time. These dummies should reveal whether being at the inside is
informative to other dealers. Due to their internal crossing, the inside quotes
most often come from an ECN. When one of the individual dealers moves to
the inside, this could signal important information and lead to different re-
actions by other dealers. In our model this brings an important nonlinearity
into the vector error correction model. Other nonlinearities include the ad-
justment itself. Instead of an error correction towards the midpoint of quotes,
we empirically show that the adjustment is towards the inside quotes.
As we focus on the informational role of the inside quotes, our model for
quote dynamics is related to models of information asymmetries across deal-
ers. For the Nasdaq, informational asymmetries across different dealers have
been addressed by Huang (2002). For several categories of dealers, he evaluates
the informational asymmetry between dealers in terms of price discovery by
computing Hasbrouck (1995) information shares of ECNs versus non-ECNs.
However, Huang (2002) focuses on the (non)presence of asymmetric informa-
tion and not on the consequences of this asymmetry on the quote setting of
dealers. We extend this work by looking at the consequences of this asymmetry
on the dynamics of dealer quotes.
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The nonlinear model is motivated by the developments that have taken place
at the Nasdaq. Since the studies of Christie and Schultz (1994) and Christie
et al. (1994) there has been a fierce discussion about competition at Nasdaq.
In 1997, the Order Handling Rule (OHR), stating that all trades have to be
executed at the National Best Bid or Offer, reduced the tick size and fur-
ther liberalized the operations of ECNs. This rule brought a great change to
the competitive nature of trade at Nasdaq. Nowadays over 60% of quotes are
issued by ECNs, which are also considered to be most efficient in terms of
quote setting (see e.g. Huang, 2002). Efficient ECN quotes would prohibit po-
tential collusion at Nasdaq, since ECNs would only suffer from keeping prices
above the level of marginal costs. Because being at the inside attracts order
flow, dealers compete to be at the inside and this competition should have
increased with the liberalization of ECNs. However, dealers will only improve
the inside quote by the smallest possible amount. Any further improvement
would only reduce her profits. For these reasons (increased competition and
marginal improvement beyond the inside) we propose an error correction to-
wards the inside quote, instead of the midpoint (see Hasbrouck, 1991). This
effect should be stronger after the introduction of the OHR as competition for
order flow increased.
Since ECNs are at the inside quotes most of the time, dealer quotes will be-
come more indicative. Dealer quotes would then be a means of disseminating
information. When a dealer, who is normally not at the inside, sets the in-
side quote, this can signal information about either her inventory position or
information she might possess. We therefore argue that being at the inside
reveals information and other dealers might respond to this. This motivates
the inclusion of an indicator function for dealers being at the inside.
The model we propose is designed to model the dynamic interaction in dealer
quotes. It can be seen as part of a more general VAR that also describes
the trade process (see Hasbrouck, 1991). However, as we are interested in
describing the interaction of dealer quotes, we only focus on the quote setting
process and therefore exclude other external factors that influence the quote
setting process (see Engle and Patton, 2004).
With a nonlinear model the price discovery measures of Hasbrouck (1995) can
not be applied unconditionally. In a nonlinear model the reaction to a shock
depends on the state of the system (i.e. who is currently setting the inside
quotes) and on the size and direction of the shock, i.e. moving towards or
away from the inside. We use the generalized impulse response functions of
Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) to analyze the impact of quote changes on
other dealer quotes. In our empirical analysis we consider the top two ECNs,
Island and Instinet, and the top three market makers, in terms of quoting
frequency, of 20 actively traded stocks at Nasdaq.
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We find that the nonlinear specification significantly improves the linear spec-
ification of Hasbrouck (1991), where the largest improvement is caused by the
inclusion of the inside dummies. Dealers correct strongly towards the inside
quote, but, except for Island, tend to move away from it when they have
reached it. Overall, when Island sets the inside quote, dealers adjust their
quotes to the inside as well. This effect is not present when any of the other
dealers is at the inside. We further find that all dealers have the tendency to
keep spreads small, but that this effect is strongest for ECNs. Price discovery
is addressed in terms of impulse response functions. These functions not only
allow us to determine the impact that a dealer’ s quoting behavior has on
the quotes of other dealers, but also allow us to evaluate the speed at which
this adjustment takes place. We compute impulse response functions for both
the linear and the nonlinear model. We find that the impulse responses for
the nonlinear model lead to important differences compared to the impulse
responses of the linear model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we
propose a nonlinear adjustment model for dealer quotes, which is a gener-
alization of the linear model. We further show how dealer efficiency can be
measured with nonlinear impulse-responses. In section 3 we address the data
used in this study. Section 4 presents the empirical results of our models and
discusses the results of the impulse responses. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we specify a nonlinear model for the dynamic interaction be-
tween dealer quotes. The model can be seen as a generalization of the lin-
ear vector error correction model proposed by Hasbrouck (1991). We further
propose an alternative decomposition for quotes to the decomposition of Has-
brouck (1995), for which we can analyze price discovery in terms of impulse
response functions.
For an actively traded stock at Nasdaq we consider bid and ask quotes from
the N most active dealers in terms of quoting frequency. For each dealer
i, let bit ≡ log(Bidit), where Bidit is the bid quote of dealer i at time t.
Likewise define ait ≡ log(Askit). These quotes are stacked in the vectors bt ≡
(b1t, . . . , bNt)
′ and at ≡ (a1t, . . . , aNt)
′. We further define the inside quotes iqbt
as the highest bid over all dealers and iqat as the lowest ask over all dealers.
In the data these inside quotes are determined over all dealer quotes and not
only the N most active. Finally, we define the 2N -vector of inside dummies
It = (I
b
t
′
Iat
′)′. An element Iait is equal to one if dealer i is at the inside ask
(ait = iq
a
t ). Analogously, I
b
it = 1, if bit = iq
b
t . These inside dummies and
the inside quotes are both nonlinear functions of the bid and ask quotes. We
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propose the following nonlinear vector error correction model for the dynamic
interaction in dealer quotes,

∆bt
∆at

 = Ct (·) + ΓIt−1 + Φ

∆bt−1
∆at−1

+ Ψ

 bt−1 − ι iq
b
t−1
at−1 − ι iq
a
t−1


+ θ(iqat−1 − iq
b
t−1) +

 η
b
t
ηat

 ,
(1)
where the matrices Γ, Φ and Ψ are all of dimension (2N×2N), θ is a (2N×1)
vector and ι is a (N × 1) unit vector. Ct(·) is a deterministic function of
constants, Ct(·) = α0 + α1D
O
t + α2D
S
t , where α0, α1, and α2 are (2N × 1)
parameter vectors, DOt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is for
an overnight period and zero otherwise, and DSt is a dummy variable used if
a stock split occurred. It equals 1 before the split and 0 after. The innovation
terms ηbt and η
a
t are assumed to be independently distributed, and we will later
introduce a specific structure on their conditional covariances.
The model contains two important nonlinearities. First, inside dummies are
included because being at the inside might reveal information. For example,
when dealer i, who is seldom at the inside, reaches the inside, information
might be revealed to other dealers. The opposite also holds: a dealer who
often quotes the inside, might reveal information when not quoting the inside
(see e.g. Stoll, 1989). The regime-dependent expected quote adjustments are
an important source of nonlinearity.
Second, dealers adjust their quotes relative to the deviation from the inside
quotes, instead of the midquote. To relate (1) to the linear error correction
model, partition Ψ and θ as
Ψ =

Ψ
bb Ψba
Ψab Ψaa

 , θ =

 θ
b
θa

 . (2)
Equation (1) reduces to a linear VECM if Γ = 0 and the inside quotes can be
eliminated,

Ψ
bb Ψba
Ψab Ψaa



−ι 0
0 −ι



 iq
b
t−1
iqat−1

+

 θ
b
θa

 (−1 1)

 iq
b
t−1
iqat−1

 =

0
0

 , (3)
where 0 is an N -vector of zeros. This results in the following 4N parameter
restrictions
(Ψbb + Ψba)ι = 0, θb = −Ψbbι,
(Ψab + Ψaa)ι = 0, θa = Ψaaι.
(4)
5
In the restricted model the rows of Ψ add up to zero, which imposes linear
cointegration upon the model. With these restrictions the inside quotes dis-
appear from the model and the model takes the basic form as in Hasbrouck
(1991) and Wang (2001). A Wald test, considering a χ2 distribution with 4N
degrees of freedom, can be used to test the linear model against the nonlin-
ear one. Similarly, we test the hypothesis Γ = 0 using a Wald test that is
asymptotically χ2(4N2).
The last part of the specification concerns the possible regime-dependence of
the error covariance matrix. As being at the inside may alter the behavior
of a dealer (quoting with specific information can be different from quoting
without specific information) we expect the innovation term ηt = (η
b
t
′
ηat
′)′ to
differ depending on whether a dealer is at the inside or not. Define Ωt = E [ηtη
′
t]
as the conditional covariance matrix of quote innovations at time t given the
position of the dealers relative to the inside quotes. The covariance matrix
has the natural partitioning in blocks Ωaat , Ω
ab
t and Ω
bb
t . For h = aa, ab, bb, we
specify
Ωhii,t+1 =ω
h
0i + ω
h
1iI
b
it + ω
h
2iI
a
it, (5)
Ωhij,t+1 =λ
h
0ij + λ
h
1ijI
b
it + λ
h
2ijI
a
it + λ
h
3ijI
b
jt + λ
h
4ijI
a
jt, (6)
where Ωhij,t is the covariance between a particular quote of dealer i and dealer
j. We test the null hypothesis that the parameters ω1i, ω2i and λ1j, λ2j, λ3j, λ4j
are jointly equal to zero. To test for such regime-dependent heteroskedasticity
we perform a Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979).
To discuss dealer efficiency and price discovery we opt for an alternative
approach than the approach proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) and applied by
Huang (2002). Hasbrouck (1995) considers the amount of variance each dealer
contributes to the total variance of the price process. However, a unique de-
composition does not exist when quote innovations are contemporaneously
correlated. More important, in a nonlinear system the decomposition is con-
ditional on the type of shock and state of the system. We therefore opt for an
alternative approach by computing impulse response functions. These func-
tions are computed for both the nonlinear model in (1) and the linear spec-
ification where the dummy variables are excluded and the restrictions in (4)
are imposed.
In impulse response functions an initial shock is applied to the model after
which the outcome of the shock is evaluated. As the main model that we
estimate is nonlinear, we cannot compute standard linear impulse response
functions. For nonlinear models, the impulse response functions depend on
the history of the model (i.e. the situation the market is in) and the size
of the shock applied. For linear models, impulse responses do not depend
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on this and they can be calculated in the normal way. To determine these
nonlinear impulse responses we apply the methodology as proposed by Koop
et al. (1996). However, before discussing this methodology we first define what
an appropriate shock size is.
We are interested in determining what impact private information of a partic-
ular dealer has on the quotes of other dealers and the level of prices. To find
this private shock size, we decompose the quote innovations ηbt and η
a
t into two
components. The first component refers to a market-wide shock common to
all dealers and can be seen as the public information shared by these dealers.
The second component is dealer specific and can be seen as the private infor-
mation of a dealer. As the private information is known to only this dealer,
this can affect both bid and ask quote and we therefore allow for correlation
between the bid and the ask of this dealer.
We propose the following decomposition of the innovation terms ηbt and η
a
t ,
ηbt = ǫtι + ξ
b
t ,
ηat = ǫtι + ξ
a
t ,
(7)
where ǫt is the market-wide or fundamental noise and ξ
b
t and ξ
a
t represent
the dealers’ idiosyncratic noise components. Our main interest is in the dealer
specific shocks as they indicate how other dealers react to private information.
We make the following assumptions regarding the components in (7):
E[ǫ2t ] = σ
2
ε ,
E[ξbt ξ
b
t
′
] = Ξbb,
E[ξat ξ
a
t
′] = Ξaa,
E[ξbt ξ
a
t
′] = E[ξat ξ
b
t
′
] = Ξba = Ξab,
(8)
where the (N ×N) matrices Ξaa, Ξbb, Ξba and Ξab are all diagonal. All other
moments are zero. Given these assumptions on the shocks, the unconditional
covariance matrix will have the structure
Ω˜ =

 σ
2
ε ιι
′ + Ξbb σ2ε ιι
′ + Ξba
σ2ε ιι
′ + Ξab σ2ε ιι
′ + Ξaa

 . (9)
The elements in Ξaa, Ξbb and Ξba provide us with plausible sizes of dealer
specific shocks.
With an appropriate size for a shock we can determine the nonlinear impulse
responses. For this we follow the approach of Koop et al. (1996), who consider
Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GI ). These GI are dependent on
the state of system Yt−1, and the size and direction of the shock (vt). The
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Generalized Impulse Response Function is defined as
GI(k, vt, Yt−1) = E[yt+k|vt, Yt−1]−E[yt+k|Yt−1], for k = 0, 1, . . . , K (10)
where K is the number of periods considered. The state of the system Yt
contains the current bid and ask quotes yt = (b
′
t a
′
t)
′, the inside quotes iqa =
min (at), iq
b
t = max (bt) and the inside indicators I
a
it = I(ait = iq
a
t ), I
b
it =
I(bit = iq
b
t ). The series of conditional expectations E[yt+k|vt, Yt−1] defines the
expected path of quotes conditional on the shock vt and conditional on a
specific history. The conditional expectation E[yt+k|Yt−1] leads to the expected
path conditional only on the specific history. This is also called the baseline.
To arrive at unconditional nonlinear impulse responses we can integrate over
all possible shocks and all possible histories.
For the present setting we are interested in specific shocks and histories. For
a “bid” shock to dealer i we set all elements of vt equal to zero except the two
related to the bid and ask of dealer i, which are
vi,t = ±
√
Ξbbii ,
vi+N,t =
Ξabii
Ξbbii
vi,t.
(11)
The “ask” shock is defined analogously.
To construct the baseline we integrate out all possible paths given a specific
history. We start with a specific initial situation Yt−1, e.g. a specific dealer
at the inside, and then simulate the possible paths from this initial situation
using model (1). In the simulation the inside quotes iqt and inside dummies It
are determined endogenously. The best bid is the maximum of the vector bt,
with the maximum taken over the N dealers in the model. In this respect we
differ slightly from the empirical model, in which the inside quotes were the
best quotes over all dealers in the market. Since we include the most active
dealers, the difference is very small, as one of these dealers is virtually always
at the inside. Therefore, we always have that at least one of the elements of
Iat and I
b
t is equal to one.
In the data quotes are issued at a discrete price grid and multiple dealers can
be (and often are) at the inside. When randomly drawing error terms in the
simulation, however, quotes become continuous, so that only one dealer will
be at the inside. Therefore, we define a dealer to be at the inside (i.e. the
respective inside dummy is equal to one) if her quote is within the range of
half a tick size from our simulated inside. In this way multiple dealers can be
at the inside simultaneously.
Simulation of the error terms ηt is subject to the condition that at every point
in time and for each dealer the ask quote must always be above the bid quote.
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A second condition on the simulated shocks is that they respect the conditional
covariances depending on which dealer is at the inside. For these reasons we
do not draw ηt from a normal distribution, but prefer a bootstrap approach.
We simulate the system (K + 1) steps ahead by conditionally bootstrapping
the innovation terms from our estimated model. The bootstrap is conditional
since we draw from the empirical error terms ηˆt in such a way that spreads re-
main positive at all times. If some draw ηˆt would lead to a violation of strictly
positive spreads, this draw is rejected and a new error vector is drawn. A
second reason for doing a conditional bootstrap is the regime-dependent het-
eroskedasticity that may be present in the innovation terms. The distribution
of the innovation term could be different depending on whether dealer i would
be at the inside or not. When dealer i is at the inside in the simulation, we
draw from the set of errors where dealer i was at the inside in the data. How-
ever, to perform this conditional bootstrap correctly we would have to draw
from the error term of our model conditional on the full state the model is in.
In our empirical model we consider 5 dealers, and therefore 10! permutations
of who is at the inside bid or ask. If at some point in the simulation dealers 1
and 2 are at the inside ask, and dealers 2 and 4 are at the inside bid, we would
have to condition on this complete event. Since the number of possible states
by far exceeds the number of observations, this is empirically not feasible. To
guarantee that each draw comes from a large set of shocks we would in the
example draw from the set where either one or both of dealers 1 and 2 are at
the inside ask, and either one or both of dealers 2 and 4 is at the inside bid.
The conditional bootstrap subject to the inequality restrictions on bid and
ask quotes introduces further non-linearity in the system.
When the baseline has been set conditional on the initial situation we can
apply a one standard deviation shock with the size determined by our covari-
ance matrix decomposition. The system is simulated again with the condi-
tional bootstrap and the final Generalized Impulse Response function GI(·)
is calculated by subtracting the baseline from the shocked system.
3 Data
Nasdaq dealer quotes are obtained from the Nastraq data set provided by
Nasdaq. This data set includes all transactions, dealer quotes and inside quotes
issued at the Nasdaq trading system. Since we focus on dealer behavior we
only consider the quote data in this paper. The data set contains time stamped
quotes (to the nearest second) together with the identity of the market maker.
Our sample runs from 1st February 1999 until 31st July 1999, giving us a total
of 124 trading days. Huang (2002) uses a similar data set, but for different
months. From the data set we select 20 companies that had the highest average
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trading volume over this period. Stock names and ticker symbols are reported
in the appendix in table A.1.
When studying the dynamics of quotes issued on the NYSE, Engle and Patton
(2004) include variables to capture the diurnality. They find that the diurnality
is insignificant apart from the opening 30 minutes. Chung and Zhao (2003)
show that the intraday spread pattern of Nasdaq stocks has become similar to
the intraday spread pattern for NYSE stocks. In our model we do not include
variables to capture the diurnality pattern, but we exclude the first twenty
minutes of the trading day. We therefore consider the trading day from 9.20
a.m until 4.00 p.m. Not considering the first twenty minutes also circumvents
the problem of a dealer not having posted a firm quote to the system yet.
Dealers are ranked on their quoting frequency. Quoting activity for ECNs and
the top dealer are substantially larger than for the other dealers. From this
ranking we extract the top two ECNs (Island and Instinet) and the top three
market makers for each stock. For these five dealers (we refer to dealers being
both ECNs and market makers) we observe quotes as well as inside quote
(best bid and ask quote). We remove all days where a dealer posts less than
30 quotes. Next, we correct for stock splits by multiplying the data previous to
the stock split with the ratio of the stock split. We include a dummy later on in
our model for the stock split that has taken place. Finally, we compare all the
dealer quotes with the inside quote and replace all quotes that deviate more
than $5 from the inside quote, by the previous quote. We make this correction
since a dealer always has to trade at the quotes she issued. Whenever a dealer
does not want to trade, she will set her quote far away from the inside to
prevent this quote from being hit. Since a non-willingness to trade does not
add to the price discovery process, we do not take these quotes into our model.
For zero quotes we follow the same procedure.
We sample quotes at 120 second intervals. At this sampling frequency we
hardly encounter missing observations or stale quotes. We deviate from Huang
(2002), who pools dealers into groups. Our interest is in explaining individual
dealer behavior. Moreover, Schultz (2003) shows that stocks are dominated by
only few market makers, emphasizing the difference among individual market
makers.
In table 1 we report some summary statistics for our sample. From this table
we see that spread patterns differ substantially among the different stocks and
dealers. For some stocks spreads are smaller for the market makers than for
the ECNs (AMGN), for other we observe the opposite (INTC). This might
indicate that although ECNs are taking over market share from Nasdaq, they
mainly focus on specific stocks traded at Nasdaq. Another interesting result is
that, although the ECNs are in general most efficient with their quotes, there
is still a big difference between their spreads and the inside spread. This is
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Table 1
Summary Statistics on Spreads
Stock # of days IQ Island Instinet MM1 MM2 MM3
AAPL 124 0.0794 0.465 0.487 0.483 0.500 0.562
AMAT 124 0.0772 0.217 0.327 0.634 0.656 0.540
AMGN∗ 121 0.108 1.560 1.470 0.750 0.596 0.700
AMZN 120 0.145 0.357 0.832 1.296 4.411 1.742
ATHM∗ 122 0.176 0.729 1.836 1.180 2.316 1.904
CMGI∗ 123 0.257 0.654 3.485 2.534 1.838 2.564
COMS 123 0.0667 0.167 0.166 0.260 0.296 0.263
CPWR∗ 121 0.0831 0.623 1.613 0.570 0.848 0.992
CSCO∗ 123 0.0754 0.184 0.246 0.566 0.847 0.655
DELL∗ 123 0.0654 0.109 0.137 0.452 0.378 0.289
EGRP∗ 122 0.111 0.273 0.694 0.603 0.669 0.513
INTC∗ 123 0.0707 0.207 0.167 0.464 0.531 0.475
MSFT∗ 123 0.0722 0.187 0.212 0.480 0.535 0.449
NOVL 124 0.0687 0.306 0.627 0.305 0.413 0.256
NXTL 118 0.0760 0.898 1.345 0.505 0.637 0.379
ORCL 123 0.0666 0.142 0.246 0.336 0.439 0.235
PSFT 123 0.0683 0.209 0.284 0.276 0.359 0.270
SUNW∗ 123 0.0807 0.313 0.315 0.661 0.926 0.698
WCOM 124 0.0743 0.362 0.222 0.585 0.437 0.781
YHOO∗ 123 0.169 0.427 0.821 1.324 2.640 2.689
This table reports average spreads for the firms in our sample. Data is from the
period February 1999 to August 1999. Ticker symbols with an asterisk had a stock
split occurring within the sample period. Number of days indicates the days without
recording errors or other data issues and are the number of days used for our anal-
ysis. We report average spreads for the inside quote and dealer quotes in absolute
terms (dollar spreads).
confirmed for the stocks of Amgen and Intel in figure 1, where we see that
ECN spreads are relatively large compared to the spread for the inside quotes.
These two stocks are selected because they are two representative cases for
the more liquid stocks (INTC), where ECNs have smaller spreads than market
makers, and less liquid stocks (AMGN), where market makers have the smaller
spreads. Therefore these two stocks will be used as examples throughout the
remainder of the paper.
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Figure 1. Average spreads for Amgen and Intel per dealer
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This figure shows average dollar spreads per intra-
daily interval over the whole sample periods for the
stock Amgen and Intel (9.50am - 4pm).
As we excluded the first 20 minutes of the day, we see that the intradaily
pattern is quite stable and that we do not observe a strong U-shaped pattern
over the day. This is in line with the findings of Chan et al. (1995) who observe
that the U-shaped pattern for Nasdaq stocks is much smaller than for NYSE
listed stocks. From these graphs we can also infer that the inside quote is very
stable over the day. Table 2 reports the fraction of times that dealers are at
the inside. We find that overall ECNs are at the inside most of the time, which
is in line with Huang (2002).
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Table 2
Fraction of quotes at the inside for all dealers
Stock Island Instinet MM1 MM2 MM3
bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask bid ask
AAPL 0.392 0.428 0.391 0.434 0.177 0.177 0.153 0.162 0.135 0.166
AMAT 0.594 0.658 0.408 0.417 0.105 0.111 0.082 0.079 0.184 0.158
AMGN 0.284 0.325 0.382 0.408 0.106 0.095 0.198 0.168 0.144 0.115
AMZN 0.543 0.597 0.287 0.276 0.048 0.045 0.029 0.035 0.085 0.059
ATHM 0.407 0.447 0.351 0.368 0.136 0.111 0.069 0.050 0.098 0.076
CMGI 0.516 0.550 0.212 0.216 0.099 0.094 0.142 0.136 0.071 0.061
COMS 0.572 0.598 0.608 0.610 0.330 0.269 0.288 0.240 0.346 0.261
CPWR 0.347 0.368 0.349 0.472 0.122 0.126 0.104 0.122 0.054 0.059
CSCO 0.607 0.646 0.519 0.494 0.143 0.105 0.131 0.117 0.068 0.048
DELL 0.708 0.744 0.637 0.646 0.277 0.239 0.275 0.281 0.221 0.182
EGRP 0.539 0.567 0.323 0.314 0.196 0.157 0.220 0.179 0.241 0.182
INTC 0.570 0.627 0.534 0.550 0.195 0.180 0.166 0.175 0.203 0.193
MSFT 0.595 0.640 0.574 0.574 0.142 0.134 0.132 0.112 0.139 0.170
NOVL 0.500 0.487 0.584 0.582 0.231 0.240 0.143 0.155 0.348 0.280
NXTL 0.284 0.346 0.534 0.570 0.137 0.170 0.123 0.155 0.213 0.199
ORCL 0.645 0.688 0.613 0.599 0.267 0.263 0.272 0.280 0.376 0.374
PSFT 0.498 0.465 0.491 0.507 0.368 0.286 0.303 0.209 0.321 0.302
SUNW 0.499 0.579 0.471 0.476 0.098 0.072 0.079 0.071 0.119 0.126
WCOM0.468 0.541 0.542 0.540 0.125 0.109 0.213 0.176 0.065 0.084
Row sums can add to more than one, since several dealers can be at the inside
simultaneously.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of the model proposed in section 2. We
first report the parameter estimates of the nonlinear model and the various
tests proposed in section 2. Next we discuss the nonlinear impulse response
functions for two selected stocks from the sample, AMGN and INTC. Finally,
we comment on the linear model as proposed by Hasbrouck (1991) by com-
paring the linear impulse responses with the nonlinear impulse responses.
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Table 3
Statistics for the Nonlinear model
Linear VECM Γ R
2
Linear VECM Γ R
2
χ2(20) χ2(100) χ2(20) χ2(100)
AAPL 111.55 1238.0 0.16 EGRP 39.56 343.79 0.16
AMAT 57.30 1397.9 0.18 INTC 35.78 499.71 0.18
AMGN 117.40 1690.2 0.15 MSFT 86.96 696.34 0.18
AMZN 34.85 480.83 0.12 NOVL 23.50 1174.2 0.16
ATHM 37.61 605.32 0.18 NXTL 72.23 1533.7 0.15
CMGI 67.58 580.54 0.20 ORCL 56.79 711.10 0.13
COMS 44.57 747.46 0.17 PSFT 123.09 802.91 0.18
CPWR 76.13 1133.2 0.15 SUNW 59.26 1378.7 0.17
CSCO 22.36 980.68 0.19 WCOM 29.97 1302.9 0.21
DELL 21.66 698.27 0.18 YHOO 51.77 666.57 0.14
This table reports tests of the nonlinear model. We report the Wald statistic for the
restrictions (4) that reduce the dynamics to the linear VECM, the Wald statistic
for the coefficient matrix of the inside dummies in (1). Entries in bold face indi-
cate significance at the 1% level. We also report the average R-squared of the ten
equations in the system.
4.1 Estimation Results
We start the discussion of the results by testing the nonlinear model against
the linear VECM. Wald statistics per stock are computed for the hypothesis
Γ = 0 and for the restrictions in (4) and are reported in table 3.
The addition of inside quotes leads to a significant improvement of the model
for all twenty stocks. The inside dummies are all significant at a 1% level and
contribute strongly to the nonlinearity. For 14 of the 20 stocks we also reject
the linearity restrictions on Ψ and θ at the 1% level and for 16 stocks at the 5%
level. The average R-squared per stock ranges between 0.11 and 0.21. This fit
also differs per dealers (not reported), where the average fit for Island equals
0.18, for Instinet 0.19, MM1 0.22 and MM2 and MM3 both 0.13.
Table 4 presents the median coefficients of the lagged inside dummies for all
stocks in the sample. We first consider the effects of the change in a quote,
when that quote is at the inside (the diagonal of the top left and the bottom
right quadrant). For the individual dealers (MM1, MM2, MM3) the effect is
clear cut. If they are at the inside bid, the negative coefficient implies that
they tend to decrease their bid quote, moving away from the inside. When they
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Table 4
Matrix of Median coefficients for Inside Dummies (Γ)
Ib
t−1
Ia
t−1
∆bt ISLD INST MM1 MM2 MM3 ISLD INST MM1 MM2 MM3
ISLD 0 0.021 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.026 -0.027 0 0.006 -0.001
(12) (11) (1) (1) (2) (13) (13) (1) (0) (1)
INST 0.031 -0.038 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.034 -0.024 -0.006 0.002 0.001
(12) (13) (0) (1) (1) (15) (10) (0) (0) (1)
MM1 0.026 0.016 -0.051 0.002 -0.007 -0.028 -0.012 -0.013 0.002 0.006
(15) (10) (14) (3) (2) (16) (6) (4) (0) (1)
MM2 0.022 0.016 0.005 -0.075 -0.003 -0.027 -0.015 -0.001 0.003 0.006
(12) (9) (0) (18) (1) (15) (8) (0) (3) (0)
MM3 0.034 0.020 -0.001 0.002 -0.063 -0.037 -0.019 0.001 0.001 0.022
(18) (13) (0) (5) (18) (19) (14) (1) (0) (12)
∆at
ISLD 0.023 0.014 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.013 -0.019 0.003 0.001 0.002
(12) (11) (0) (0) (0) (11) (8) (1) (0) (1)
INST 0.028 0.014 0.003 0.001 -0.007 -0.030 0.021 -0.003 0 0.005
(15) (8) (0) (0) (0) (11) (10) (1) (0) (0)
MM1 0.026 0.014 0.009 0.003 -0.002 -0.017 -0.012 0.047 0.001 0.010
(14) (6) (4) (0) (0) (10) (5) (16) (1) (1)
MM2 0.021 0.011 0.003 0.006 -0.006 -0.022 -0.018 -0.005 0.085 0.005
(12) (5) (1) (4) (0) (13) (9) (0) (19) (1)
MM3 0.033 0.019 -0.004 0.001 -0.030 -0.036 -0.017 0.003 0 0.080
(18) (14) (0) (1) (13) (19) (13) (0) (0) (20)
This table reports median coefficients for the Inside Dummies in the nonlinear model
(1). The number of firms for which coefficients are significant at the 1% level are
reported in parentheses.
are at the inside ask they are also expected to move away from the inside, as
indicated by the positive coefficients at the diagonal for the ask dynamics.
The estimates are significant for most stocks at the 1% level. The results are
different for the two ECNs. Here the coefficients are less often significant and
the median over all stocks is much closer to zero. The effects are particularly
small to non-existent for Island.
There are several interesting cross-effects observed in the table. First, there is
a positive and symmetric reaction of other dealers’ bid and ask quotes (the
first columns of each quadrant) to Island being at the inside bid. Dealers
tend to raise both quotes with the same amount when Island is at the inside
bid. A similar result is obtained when Island is at the inside ask, all other
dealers tend to lower their quotes, again in a symmetric fashion. This is an
indication of the importance of this ECN. For Instinet the results are similar,
though less significant. On the other side of the spectrum we observe the
reaction of the ECNs to market makers being at the inside. There is only a
very small reaction of ECNs to market makers being at the inside, with only
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Table 5
Matrix of Median coefficients for Lagged Quotes (Φ)
∆bt−1 ∆at−1
∆bt ISLD INST MM1 MM2 MM3 ISLD INST MM1 MM2 MM3
ISLD -0.101 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.038 0.013 0.001 0.010 0.015
(18) (0) (0) (1) (0) (15) (2) (0) (0) (0)
INST 0.008 -0.129 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.016
(1) (17) (0) (0) (0) (10) (3) (2) (1) (1)
MM1 0 0.006 -0.105 0 -0.004 0.015 0.014 0.024 0.015 0.020
(1) (1) (20) (5) (2) (5) (6) (6) (2) (2)
MM2 0.010 0.012 0.008 -0.108 0.013 0.032 0.017 0.005 0.024 0.003
(2) (2) (2) (19) (3) (8) (7) (1) (7) (0)
MM3 0.016 0.014 0.019 0.005 -0.097 0.028 0.016 0.011 0.006 0.019
(5) (8) (6) (4) (15) (10) (7) (2) (1) (3)
∆at
ISLD 0.033 0.013 0.008 0.004 0.004 -0.098 -0.004 -0.011 -0.001 -0.003
(13) (4) (1) (0) (0) (15) (1) (2) (0) (0)
INST 0.022 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.007 -0.133 -0.011 -0.004 0.002
(11) (2) (6) (1) (0) (3) (19) (0) (0) (1)
MM1 0.014 0.012 0.025 0.011 0.029 -0.002 0.003 -0.127 -0.008 0.002
(5) (5) (8) (3) (7) (1) (1) (20) (2) (2)
MM2 0.020 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.010 0.003 -0.005 -0.116 -0.004
(9) (8) (5) (5) (3) (4) (2) (1) (19) (1)
MM3 0.018 0.015 0.019 0.007 0.027 0.023 0.011 -0.002 0.005 -0.096
(8) (6) (7) (4) (6) (6) (4) (2) (2) (17)
This table reports median coefficients for the lagged quotes (Φ) in the nonlinear
model (1). The number of firms for which coefficients are significant at the 1% level
are reported in parentheses.
few significant coefficients.
In table 5 we present the median coefficients of the AR(1) component. All
coefficients along the main diagonal are negative. Hence, when a dealer raises
a quote she is more inclined to lower that quote again in the next period. The
magnitude of this effect is the same for all dealers. Furthermore, there are
some cross effects present between the bid and ask of the same dealer, but
most of the other cross effects are insignificant.
Table 6 presents the median coefficients of the error correction term. Again
we observe a strong effect along the main diagonal, where all coefficients are
negative and significant. Hence, all dealers adjust their quotes towards the
respective inside quotes. Note that these coefficients get smaller in absolute
terms for the less active dealers. This is in line with the fractions of time
a dealer is at the inside as we observed in table 2 and indicates that error
correction effects are stronger for ECNs than for market makers. We hardly
observe cross effects between bid and ask quotes of the same dealer, except
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Table 6
Matrix of Median coefficients for Error Correction term (Ψ)
(bt−1 − ιiqbt−1) (at−1 − ιiq
a
t−1
)
∆bt ISLD INST MM1 MM2 MM3 ISLD INST MM1 MM2 MM3
ISLD -0.604 0.021 0.031 0.014 0.011 -0.010 0.013 0.010 0.003 -0.005
(20) (9) (11) (5) (4) (5) (1) (3) (0) (2)
INST 0.024 -0.530 0.019 0.012 0.018 0.006 0.002 0 -0.004 -0.016
(3) (20) (2) (6) (5) (1) (4) (2) (0) (2)
MM1 0.033 0.028 -0.553 0.023 0.017 0.009 0.003 -0.021 -0.004 -0.011
(12) (7) (20) (13) (9) (3) (3) (6) (2) (3)
MM2 0.018 0.011 0.012 -0.241 0.010 0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.021 -0.006
(5) (4) (2) (19) (3) (0) (1) (4) (9) (3)
MM3 0.021 0.010 0 -0.002 -0.215 0.009 0.005 -0.009 -0.002 -0.086
(3) (3) (5) (4) (20) (2) (1) (5) (0) (16)
∆at
ISLD -0.006 0.009 0.006 0.001 -0.002 -0.630 0.034 0.047 0.024 0.018
(5) (2) (1) (3) (3) (20) (9) (17) (10) (4)
INST -0.004 0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.013 0.036 -0.486 0.045 0.017 0.021
(1) (2) (0) (1) (3) (8) (20) (14) (9) (8)
MM1 0.002 0.002 -0.030 0 -0.024 0.069 0.040 -0.435 0.030 0.030
(2) (0) (8) (6) (11) (19) (15) (20) (16) (11)
MM2 0.005 0 -0.012 -0.023 -0.008 0.025 0.015 0.024 -0.208 0.013
(1) (0) (4) (11) (5) (8) (6) (9) (20) (7)
MM3 0.003 0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.079 0.012 0.016 0.009 0.007 -0.199
(1) (1) (1) (3) (18) (3) (6) (7) (6) (20)
This table reports median coefficients for the error correction term (Ψ) in the non-
linear model (1). The number of firms for which coefficients are significant at the
1% level are reported in parentheses.
for market maker 3, who has her other quote moving away from the inside
(market maker 3 is often represented by the same market maker SLKC). This
indicates that dealers only focus on the respective inside quote and do not
consider the other inside quote. All other cross effects are mostly insignificant.
Table 7 reports the median coefficients on the inside spread. As can be seen
from the signs of the coefficients (positive for bids and negative for asks)
dealers adjust their quotes to keep spreads small. This adjustment is stronger
for ECNs than for market makers. This confirms the notion that ECNs profit
from keeping spreads small, whereas market makers could potentially profit
from larger spreads. Therefore, ECNs are more inclined to keep spreads small
than market makers. Another interesting result is that the coefficients on the
changes in bids are always larger, in absolute terms, than the coefficients of
the changes in the ask. Hence there is an asymmetric adjustment of dealer
quotes to the size of the inside spread. Dealers are more inclined to raise the
bid quote than to lower the ask quote.
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Table 7
Median Coefficients for the Inside Spread (θ)
∆bt aiqt−1 − biqt−1 ∆at aiqt−1 − biqt−1
ISLD 0.305 (17) ISLD -0.135 (10)
INST 0.340 (19) INST -0.164 (12)
MM1 0.205 (17) MM1 -0.066 (5)
MM2 0.170 (13) MM2 -0.026 (2)
MM3 0.121 (7) MM3 -0.004 (5)
This table reports results for inside spread coefficients in model (1). We report
median coefficients for θ and the number of firms for which θ is significant at the
1% level.
The results presented above all indicate that bid and ask quotes display non-
linear features, with the strongest nonlinearity related to a dealer being at
the inside or not. As being at the inside influences the dynamics of dealer
quotes we are interested in whether it also affects second order moments. We
perform a Breusch-Pagan test on (5) and (6) to test for regime-dependent
heteroskedasticity. In table 8 we present the results. We report the number of
regressions for which the test statistic is significant at the 5% level. The diago-
nal of this matrix represent the variance of each dealer’s bid or ask quote and
the off-diagonal the covariances. The results remain inconclusive. In about
50% of the cases we find a significant relationship between the variance of
quote changes and the inside dummies. For the off-diagonal elements we find
less significance. We remain inconclusive in this, but note that for some stocks
in the sample this effect has a significant impact on the behavior of dealers.
As the results of this regime-dependent heteroskedasticity test remain in-
conclusive, we can motivate the unconditional decomposition proposed in
(7). If regime-dependent heteroskedasticity was present, the decomposition
in (7) has to take this into account and decompose the covariance matrix
conditional on the state that it is in. We impose the structure of the co-
variance matrix as in (9) on the empirical covariance matrix that we obtain
from the regression. We use GMM to achieve this, by fitting the parame-
ters in our restricted covariance matrix to the unrestricted sample covari-
ance matrix, i.e. we use the N(2N + 1) different orthogonality conditions in
E[Ω˜− ηtη
′
t] = 0 to fit the 3N + 1 parameters in Ω˜.
We discuss results for AMGN and INTC in some detail and report the un-
restricted covariance matrices in panel A of tables 9 and 10, and show the
restricted covariance matrices in panel B.
For AMGN we observe that the noise terms for the ECNs are much larger
than for the market makers. In table 2 we already found that for this rela-
tively illiquid stock, ECNs had the larger spreads. Clearly, there is a lot of
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Table 8
Breusch Pagan test for Regime dependent Heteroscedasticity:
ηb1 η
b
2 η
b
3 η
b
4 η
b
5 η
a
1 η
a
2 η
a
3 η
a
4 η
a
5
ηb1 12 - - - - - - - - -
ηb2 8 6 - - - 9 - - - -
ηb3 7 4 11 - - 7 3 - - -
ηb4 10 5 6 11 - 8 4 5 - -
ηb5 11 8 9 8 11 11 7 9 7 -
ηa1 6 - - - - 12 - - - -
ηa2 5 2 - - - 7 9 - - -
ηa3 10 4 4 - - 9 5 8 - -
ηa4 8 6 5 6 - 7 7 5 10 -
ηa5 11 8 8 7 9 10 7 10 7 10
This table reports the number of cases in which significant regime-dependent het-
eroskedasticity at the 5% level was found. The main diagonal of the table shows
this number for the variances using the regression
Ωii,t+1 = ω0i + ω1iI
b
it + ω2iI
a
it,
where Ωii,t+1 is the bid or ask variance of dealer i, I
b
it is the inside dummy equal to
1 if the bid of dealer i is at the inside and Iait the inside dummy equal to 1 if the ask
of dealer i is at the inside. All other elements show this number for the covariances,
using the regression
Ωij,t+1 = λ0ij + λ1ijI
b
it + λ2ijI
a
it + λ3ijI
b
jt + λ4ijI
a
jt,
where Ωij,t+1 is the covariance between a particular quote of dealer i and dealer j.
idiosyncratic noise around the dynamics of these ECNs. Another interesting
result is the cross-covariance between ECNs. Although small compared to the
variances, these are still twice the size of the common market part. A final
remark is the correlation between the bid and ask quote for market maker 3.
These error components are almost perfectly correlated.
Turning to the covariance matrix of Intel in table 10 we observe the same
thing for market maker 3. However, for this stock the market makers tend to
have higher variances than the ECNs. Further, the cross-effects between ECNs
have disappeared.
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Table 9
Covariance Matrix of the Nonlinear model for Amgen
Panel A: Unrestricted Covariance Matrix
1.224 0.073 0.036 0.037 0.053 0.072 0.073 0.036 0.036 0.052
0.073 0.587 0.036 0.034 0.046 0.062 0.082 0.029 0.033 0.044
0.036 0.036 0.070 0.031 0.034 0.036 0.032 0.026 0.027 0.033
0.037 0.034 0.031 0.053 0.037 0.035 0.032 0.026 0.035 0.036
0.053 0.046 0.034 0.037 0.088 0.043 0.043 0.030 0.034 0.080
0.072 0.062 0.036 0.035 0.043 0.864 0.060 0.032 0.031 0.043
0.073 0.082 0.032 0.032 0.043 0.060 0.473 0.030 0.032 0.044
0.036 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.030 0.032 0.030 0.073 0.028 0.030
0.036 0.033 0.027 0.035 0.034 0.031 0.032 0.028 0.058 0.034
0.052 0.044 0.033 0.036 0.080 0.043 0.044 0.030 0.034 0.087
Panel B: Restricted Covariance Matrix
1.224 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.072 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
0.039 0.587 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.082 0.039 0.039 0.039
0.039 0.039 0.070 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.026 0.039 0.039
0.039 0.039 0.039 0.053 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.035 0.039
0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.088 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.080
0.072 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.864 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
0.039 0.082 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.473 0.039 0.039 0.039
0.039 0.039 0.026 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.073 0.039 0.039
0.039 0.039 0.039 0.035 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.058 0.039
0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.080 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.087
This table reports the unrestricted and restricted covariance matrix for the stock
Amgen. The unrestricted covariance matrix is decomposed into a common factor
(market-wide news) and an idiosyncratic dealer components and takes the form
Ω˜ =

 σ2ε ιι′ + Ξbb σ2ε ιι′ + Ξba
σ2ε ιι
′ + Ξab σ2ε ιι
′ + Ξaa

 .
where σ2ε represents the market-wide component and Ξ
bb, Ξba, Ξab and Ξaa are the
dealer idiosyncratic components.
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Table 10
Covariance Matrix of the Nonlinear model for Intel
Panel A: Unrestricted Covariance Matrix
0.082 0.041 0.043 0.035 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.037 0.032 0.039
0.041 0.051 0.041 0.034 0.040 0.037 0.038 0.035 0.032 0.039
0.043 0.041 0.101 0.038 0.042 0.039 0.040 0.036 0.033 0.040
0.035 0.034 0.038 0.123 0.034 0.031 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.033
0.040 0.040 0.042 0.034 0.076 0.038 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.065
0.039 0.037 0.039 0.031 0.038 0.060 0.038 0.036 0.032 0.038
0.039 0.038 0.040 0.032 0.039 0.038 0.050 0.036 0.033 0.038
0.037 0.035 0.036 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.089 0.034 0.036
0.032 0.032 0.033 0.029 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.129 0.034
0.039 0.039 0.040 0.033 0.065 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.074
Panel B: Restricted Covariance Matrix
0.082 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
0.036 0.051 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.036
0.036 0.036 0.101 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.123 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.029 0.036
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.076 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.065
0.039 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.060 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
0.036 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.050 0.036 0.036 0.036
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.089 0.036 0.036
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.129 0.036
0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.065 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.074
This table reports the unrestricted and restricted covariance matrix for the stock
Intel. The unrestricted covariance matrix is decomposed into a common factor
(market-wide news) and idiosyncratic dealer components and takes the form
Ω˜ =

 σ2ε ιι′ + Ξbb σ2ε ιι′ + Ξba
σ2ε ιι
′ + Ξab σ2ε ιι
′ + Ξaa

 .
where σ2ε represents the market-wide component and Ξ
bb, Ξba, Ξab and Ξaa are the
dealer idiosyncratic components.
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The fundamental noise in the market concerns the information common to
all dealers. This can be considered as market wide information (public infor-
mation) but is also due to time aggregation of dealer quotes (see Hasbrouck,
1995). With the exception of market maker 3 all correlations between private
information in bid and ask quotes of individual dealers are close to zero. This
is in line with Jang and Venkatesh (1991), who find that in most cases dealers
adjust their quote only on one side of the market when they receive private
information.
Although being very informative on the nature of the dealer, the main use of
this decomposition is to provide us with parameters that indicate the size of
the fundamental news and the idiosyncratic part, individual to every dealer.
We need the sizes of these idiosyncratic parts to evaluate the impulse response
functions of the nonlinear model.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions
After having determined reasonable shock sizes, we can now conduct exper-
iments on dealer quote reactions to dealer specific shocks. We simulate the
model 5000 times and use a time horizon of 20 steps which in our model rep-
resents 40 minutes. Although the price discovery process will be much faster
than 40 minutes for most stocks, we perform this long-term simulation to check
the stability of the system. With unrestricted estimates of the inside dummy
effects ΓIt in (1), we can not a priori guarantee that the model is stable. In
all cases, i.e. all stocks and all shocks, we found that the long-term impact of
a shock is finite and the same for all bids and asks. This confirms that the
system behaves as a cointegrated system with a single common trend.
We consider four experiments of interest. The first experiment is a one stan-
dard deviation idiosyncratic shock for a specific dealer towards the inside
quote, when all dealers start at average spreads. The shock is applied to one
quote, bid or ask, where the other quote receives a shock with a size dependent
on the correlation between bid and ask. The results of these impulse response
functions for AMGN and INTC are shown in figure 2. We only show shocks
for the bid quotes as the plots for the asks show similar patterns. These graphs
show how the impact of a one standard deviation shock to a dealer affects the
quotes of the other dealers.
For AMGN we see that the market makers have the largest impact on quotes.
The second market maker, MLCO has the largest impact on the level of quotes,
closely followed by the first market maker, MASH. Instinet has about the same
impact on the quote level as the last market maker, SLKC. The Island ECN
has the lowest impact.
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Figure 2. Nonlinear Impulse response functions for Amgen (left) and Intel (right),
starting at average spreads, shock inwards.
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This figure shows nonlinear impulse response functions for the stocks Amgen and
Intel. All dealers start at average spreads and each graph represents a one standard
deviation inward shock (towards the inside quote) to a particular dealer quote (only
bid quotes are displayed). The vertical axes in the graphs are measured in standard
deviations the horizontal axes in time. The displayed graphs show the cumulative
effect of a shock.
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For Intel we observe the opposite. For this stock ECNs affect quote levels
most. In this case Island affects the quote level most, followed by Instinet. The
market makers affect the quote level marginally, where we actually observe a
slight decrease in the quote level.
A general result is that the impulse response functions relate to the ranking
in spreads for dealers. For Amgen market makers have smaller spreads than
the ECNs. In this case we observe that a shock to these dealers has a larger
impact on the level of quotes than a shock to the ECNs. The opposite holds for
Intel. These graphs indicate that price discovery and asymmetric information
is related to the size of the spreads that dealers quote, which is in line with
the theoretical framework of Kyle (1985).
The level of convergence is not the only relevant indicator of price discovery.
Another relevant issue is the speed at which quotes converge to this level. This
speed indicates how fast price discovery occurs and how quickly information
of a particular dealer is incorporated into the quotes of other dealers. It also
shows how transparent information of a particular dealer is to other dealers.
For Amgen we observe that the information in quote changes of the ECNs are
incorporated fastest by the other dealers, with the fastest quote adjustment
to Instinet. The slowest adjustment is to a quote change of market maker
2 (MLCO), which has the highest impact on the level of quotes. For Intel
we observe the fastest quote adjustment to Island. Overall, information is
incorporated more quickly for Intel, the more liquid stock, than for Amgen.
We consider the next two experiments jointly as they do not lead to any signif-
icant differences from the previous situation. The first experiment we consider
is a one standard deviation shock inwards, where the particular dealer starts
at the inside, all other dealers are at average spreads. The second experiment
has the same initial situation as the first experiment but now we apply a shock
outwards. Figures 3 and 4 show the plots of these functions. There are some
differences between the outcomes of the functions compared to the previous
nonlinear impulse response function, but these are all marginal. Hence, we
conclude that the initial situation does not influence the outcome of the func-
tion that much, and improving the inside or leaving the inside quote does not
reveal any additional information.
The last experiment that we consider is a situation where all dealers start at
average spread, where we apply a shock such that the respective dealer reaches
the inside. The initial situation is equal to the situation of the first experiment,
but the shock size differs. The plots of the impulse response functions are
shown in figure 5. In this case we do observe some clear differences with the
impulse responses in figure 2. Firstly, the impact that the market makers
have on the quote level for Amgen is lower in this experiment. Moreover,
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Figure 3. Nonlinear Impulse response functions for Amgen (left) and Intel (right),
starting at inside for dealer, shock inwards.
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This figure shows nonlinear impulse response functions for the stocks Amgen and
Intel. All dealers start at the inside quote and each graph represents a one standard
deviation inward shock to a particular dealer quote (only bid quotes are displayed).
The vertical axes in the graphs are measured in standard deviations the horizontal
axes in time. The displayed graphs show the cumulative effect of a shock.
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Figure 4. Nonlinear Impulse response functions for Amgen (left) and Intel (right),
starting at inside for dealer, shock outwards.
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This figure shows nonlinear impulse response functions for the stocks Amgen and
Intel. All dealers start at the inside and each graph represents a one standard
deviation outward shock (away from the inside) to a particular dealer quote (only
bid quotes are displayed). The vertical axes in the graphs are measured in standard
deviations the horizontal axes in time. The displayed graphs show the cumulative
effect of a shock.
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Figure 5. Nonlinear Impulse response functions for Amgen (left) and Intel (right),
starting at average spreads, shock reaching inside
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This figure shows nonlinear impulse response functions for the stocks Amgen and
Intel. All dealers start at average spreads and each graph represents an inward shock
reaching the inside to a particular dealer quote (only bid quotes are displayed). The
vertical axes in the graphs are measured in standard deviations the horizontal axes
in time. The displayed graphs show the cumulative effect of a shock.
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Figure 6. Long-Run impact of a one Standard Deviation shock for the Linear and
Nonlinear impulse response function
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This figure shows the long-run impact of a one standard deviation shock for both
the linear and the nonlinear model. The unit of the vertical axes is in standard
deviations and the horizontal axes show the particular dealers.
the impact of Instinet increases even further and has a higher impact on the
quote level than the last market maker. The last market maker has an impact
approximately equal to the impact Island has. For Intel we only observe some
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marginal differences.
Overall, the results of these responses show that the dynamics of quotes are
insensitive to the initial situation, but more sensitive to the shock size.
The question remains whether these nonlinear impulse responses lead to dif-
ferent results than traditional linear impulse responses. As a robustness check
we compute linear impulse responses. These are computed by estimating (1)
imposing the restrictions in (3) and excluding the inside dummies. Although
linear impulse responses are insensitive to the shock size and the history of
the model, we do take the correlations between a dealer’s bid and ask quote
into account. These are determined by the decomposition in (7).
To compare the linear impulse responses to the nonlinear impulse responses we
consider the long-run impact of a one standard deviation shock to a particular
dealer for both functions. The nonlinear impulse response function considered
is a one standard deviation shock inwards, starting at average spreads (see
figure 2). The long-run impact is determined by the average level of bid and
ask quotes of a particular dealer 40 minutes after the shock has been applied.
In figure 6 we compare the linear impulse response function to the nonlinear
impulse response function for both Amgen and Intel. Since standard errors of
the long-run impact coefficients are never larger than 0.04, the differences are
statistically significant in most cases.
For Amgen we observe considerable differences between the linear and nonlin-
ear specification. The largest difference is that in the nonlinear specification
shocks have a larger impact on the level of quotes. The impulse responses also
lead to a different view on the importance of dealers for the price discovery
process. In the linear specification market makers 2 and 3 (MLCO and SLKC)
appear to be the leading market makers. In the nonlinear specification the
importance of SLKC declines, whereas the importance of the other MLCO
and market maker 1 (MASH) increases.
For Intel we observe an opposite pattern. In general, the impact of a one stan-
dard deviation shock on the quote level declines in the nonlinear specification.
Again the linear and nonlinear specification lead to different results in terms
of price discovery. In the linear specification Instinet leads in terms of price
discovery. For the nonlinear specification this is Island.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a nonlinear error correction model for quote changes,
which extends the linear model of Hasbrouck (1991). Nonlinear dynamics are
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introduced through the inside bid and ask quotes. The model allows quote
adjustments to be different depending on who is currently at the inside and
allows for an error correction towards the inside quotes instead of the midpoint.
We test for a third form of nonlinearity in the distribution of the error terms,
which we allow to depend on which dealer is at the inside.
Overall, we find that our model significantly improves the linear specification.
Specifically, we find that all dealers strongly correct towards the inside quotes.
However, all dealers, except Island, have the tendency to move away from the
inside when they are at the inside. We further observe that all dealer move
towards the inside quote when Island ECN is at the inside. Dealers react
asymmetrically to the size of the spread, by raising their bid quote more than
lowering their ask. The results for the regime-dependent heteroskedasticity
tests remain inconclusive.
Finally, we discuss price discovery in an impulse response function frame-
work. We use a conditional bootstrap to compute nonlinear impulse response
functions. We find that the initial situation of the model does not affect the
outcome of the function, but the size of the shock does. Further, the outcomes
of the nonlinear model differ substantially from the outcomes of the linear
model. Ignoring these nonlinearities leads to different conclusions towards who
dominates in terms of price discovery.
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A Appendix
Table A.1
Ticker symbols and company names
Symbol Company name Symbol Company name
AAPL Apple Computer Inc. EGRP E*TRADE Group, Inc.
AMAT Applied Materials Inc. INTC Intel Corporation
AMGN Amgen Inc. MSFT Microsoft Corporation
AMZN Amazon.com Inc. NOVL Novell Inc.
ATHM At Home Corporation NXTL Nextel Communications
CMGI CMGI, Inc. ORCL Oracle Corporation
COMS 3Com Corporation PSFT Peoplesoft Inc.
CPWR Compuware Corporation SUNW Sun Microsystems Inc.
CSCO Cisco Systems Inc. WCOM MCI WorldCom Inc.
DELL Dell Computer Corporation YHOO Yahoo!, Inc.
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